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INTRODUCTION: OBSERVATIONS ON
TEACHING GRISWOLD
Hugh C. Macgill*

T

HE Connecticut Law Review Symposium, held last Spring at the
University of Connecticut School of Law to mark the twenty-fifth
anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut,1 began with remarks by Catherine Roraback, who represented Mrs. Griswold and Dr. Buxton
throughout the litigation and in the larger battle in defense of family
counseling clinics in Connecticut. Those who were present learned a
great deal about the human context out of which the case arose, and
the strategic judgments that permitted the decision to emerge as it did.
The life of that decision, both in theory and as it variously does or does
not apply to some of the more problematic contemporary aspects of the
human condition, was the principal subject of the articles now published here.
In between the social genesis of ihe original legal dispute and the
broad theoretical implications of the decision rendered, Griswold is a
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. BA., Yale University,
LL.B., University of Virginia.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:853

case to be taught and to be learned from in the classroom. Every course
in the curriculum has its kaleidoscopic cases-those that never look
quite the same two years in' a row, that yield new patterns and possibilities each time they are held to the light. The teacher who tires of
playing with them and reflecting upon them should move into another
field. Griswold is one of the kaleidoscopes of constitutional law. I can
best illustrate the point by describing one year's encounter with it in
class.
Preparing for that class, I had stuffed into my mind about all it
could hold for the day-the failure of the earlier attempts to put the
constitutionality of the Connecticut statute 2 before the Court, the theoretical approaches available to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute, the way these approaches are reflected in the opinions of the
justices, Justice Douglas's artful evasions, the narrow reading, the
broad reading, the road to Roe3 and so forth. I was as ready as I was
going to get, but still had twenty minutes before my class. Trying to
keep the pieces from falling out of place, or out altogether, I paced the
hall. I played one more time with the notion of penumbras and found
myself laughing out loud. The entire Douglas opinion suddenly seemed
too ridiculous a piece of work to take seriously, still less to teach. I put
my head into the office of a colleague, Loftus Becker, and announced
my unwelcome epiphany. He gazed at me with reassuring solemnity
and remarked that he thought it might well be the best opinion Justice
Douglas ever wrote: Given the result the majority had settled upon,
how better could it have been accomplished? That begged, as I shall
beg, the great question-why did the majority settle upon that result-but it gave me food for fortifying reflection in the five minutes
that remained.
The class proceeded along lines familiar to anyone who has taught
or taken a course in constitutional law. The Court's prior opportunities
to review the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute, and its resourceful avoidance of them, were canvassed. Due attention was paid to
the doctrinal alternatives available to the Court in 1965 and the pitfalls
of each, so that everyone could appreciate the delicacy with which Justice Douglas slalomed among them, the elegance with which he forged
the penumbral link between a concept of privacy and a text that does
not contain the word. Balls were hidden, balls were found. There came
2.
3.

CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 53-32 (1958).

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the moment, though, as inevitably it will do in any classroom discussion
of Griswold, when an enthusiast asked, "But what of the Goldberg
opinion? Would not this all be much simpler and more forthright if
done through an interpretation of the ninth amendment?"
One cannot, in that situation, simply declare ex cathedra that no
decision of the Court before or since has ever turned on that amendment. Nor may one caution that the Goldberg concurrence is its apogee
to date, or declare that though reliance on the ninth amendment does
not lead directly to disbarment, a ninth amendment argument may
raise questions under the sixth amendment. Something more searching
must be said. Unfortunately, this moment arose toward the end of an
evening class, and whatever searching insight might have come to me
earlier in the day, I felt like a tenor whose voice has failed with two
scenes to go before the curtain. In one of those flashes of inspiration
that teachers always must guard against, I realized that the answer
was to be found in fishing.
Let us suppose that privacy is the fish to be
caught-constitutionally. If the fisherman is out for dinner rather than
sport, a stick of dynamite tossed into a rustic pond will do very well.
The fish float to the surface in large numbers and need only be scooped
up. If the fisherman is either terribly hungry or not terribly sporting,
the choice will be spinning gear-an inexpensive rod, a technically ingenious reel invented (unsurprisingly) in France, and an assortment of
artificial lures, usually made of metal, that a relative novice can plunk
on the desired spot with very little practice. Nothing further is required
except a stout line and a strong arm. But the fisherman who is sporting
and not hungry at all will resort to neither of these crude techniques. If
she is serious about her business, she will fish with a dry fly, or not at
all.
To do so she must make a considerable investment. The rod will be
very expensive and possibly quite beautiful. She will have an array of
flies, some in little tin boxes kept in the numerous pockets of her fishing
vest, others stuck in the fleece hatband that is made for this purpose.
She will have spent winter evenings tying these flies herself, using
pheasant feathers, deer hair, and other arcane components sold at a
store so specialized that it is difficult to find in the yellow pages. She
will have filed the barbs off the hooks so that even a fish that is caught
will have a chance to escape. She will have studied the flow of water in
streams and the ways of the fish that live in them. She will have a keen
eye not only for the characteristics peculiar to the stream where she
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fishes, but also to the weather and the light. She will choose the fly that
best matches whatever insect her prey is most likely to feed upon, in
that weather, in that stream, at that moment. She will tie that fly to a
line so fragile that any fish could snap it when it is taut. She will stand
for hours in frigid water wearing high rubber boots, picking her way
over slippery stones, knowing that if she falls, her boots may fill and
she may drown. She will cast the fly, not with the spin-fisherman's negligent flick of the wrist, but with well-practiced movements that others
working the stream recognize as those of experience and skill-long
arcs of graceful backward-looping yards of line, worked back and forth
until the fly is "presented" at the perfect spot, in the perfect way. If a
fish strikes, she will play it slowly, with enough pressure to bring it
closer after its first run, but not so much that the line snaps, nor so
little that the barbless hook will not hold. And if the skill and patience
are there, and the fish does not run the line under a log or around a
rock, and if she gets her net under it at exactly the right moment of
exhaustion, she will have caught her fish.
But she will have done more than that. The competition in which
she has triumphed will have given the fish its chance. The "agony," in
an etymologically important sense, will have been hers as well as the
fish's. She will have demonstrated complex technical mastery over that
part of fishing which is craft, and she will have met the aesthetic requirements of form that make fishing, for some, an art. She will not
only have caught her fish; she will have earned it.
The attraction of the ninth amendment lies in its openness. There
is no body of case law to supply the constraints that the text so conspicuously lacks. That same openness, however, accounts for the court's
refusal to rely upon the amendment. Without constraints, craftmanship
is impossible and art unthinkable. Had Douglas based his opinion solely
on the ninth amendment, with its language that does not constrain, he
would, in effect, have tossed a stick of dynamite into the pond. Having
power and the will to use it (assuming four more votes), he simply
would have applied the ninth amendment to the task at hand. The dynamite would have sufficed, if the only task was the killing of a fish.
Such is the essence of legislation. But adjudication, especially in constitutional cases, calls for more than power and will. Legitimacy, the difference between the fish caught and the fish earned, is essential, and
power and will alone cannot confer it.
The legitimacy of the Douglas opinion in Griswold lies in its apparent respect for the accepted forms of constitutional interpretation.
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Merely following the forms is not remarkable, nor is the naked proclamation of a novel result. To bring forth something new under the constitutional sun while maintaining appearances, 4 however, is an artist's
work. Douglas did not do "as lazy judges do who win the game by
sweeping all the chessmen off the table." 5 In the elegance of his grappling with a problem that is as much aesthetic as it is technical or
intellectual lies the agonistic quality that decisively distinguishes adjudication from legislation.' That quality confers upon Griswold the legitimacy denied, for example, to Roe v. Wade,7 and that cannot be
attained in reliance upon the ninth amendment.
The students who remained awake at this point were gazing alternately at the clock, in hope, and at me, in something like horror. The
clock did save us all, and since then I have tried to rely somewhat more
on preparation than inspiration in teaching Griswold.
Nonetheless, I remain indebted to my colleague for pointing me in
the proper direction, and I remain enormously respectful of Douglas's
achievement in Griswold. His opinion stands as a great example of
Coke's distinction between natural reason and the artificial reason of
lawyers, for lack of which James I was incompetent to render justice in
his own court. It is more valuable as an instance of many of the qualities Charles Black described in his essay, "Law as an Art." 8 The aesthetic dimension of legitimacy in constitutional interpretation still is
not sufficiently grasped and, though I continue to believe that form and
ritual are as essential to legitimacy in fishing as in judging, I will not
again tax my students' tolerance with the analogy.
In fact, no finite set of analogies can capture the essence of a case
like Griswold. The articles published here, against the background of
the recollections of counsel that preceded their delivery, remind us of
the contingent character of constitutional doctrine, and its sometimes
4.

It was, after all, "[t]he image of a free constitution (that] was preserved with decent rever-

ence" in Rome on the eve of its decline. 1 E. GIBBON. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE Ro.%IAN

1 (4th ed. 1877) (emphasis added).
5. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARv. L REv. 361, 362 (1939), 48 YALE L. 379, 380
(1939), 39 COLUM. L. REv. 9, 11 (1939) (article published simultaneously in all three journals).
6. See Huizinga's essay, Play and Law, where he wrote of the agonistic nature of juridical
process, and of "the playful and the contending, lifted on to the plane of that sacred seriousness
which every society demands for its justice ..... J. Huizinga, Homo LuDeas. A STUDY OF THE
EmPiRE

PLAY ELEMENT IN CULTURE 76 (1955). As between the contending parties, of course, the judge is

a neutral arbiter. When she comes to write the opinion in a constitutional case, howvever, and must
wrestle with the text and all the glosses on it, she too contends, in "sacred seriousness."
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. See C. BLACK, THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 17 (1987).
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short half-life. The arguments presented to the Court by counsel were
not dictated by a priori commitments to abstract propositions of constitutional theory. The arguments arose from the perceived immediate
and imperative need to relieve the suffering and indignity imposed on
women in New Haven by a statute that made it impossible lawfully to
obtain medical advice and assistance in avoiding pregnancy. No established doctrine of federal constitutional law promised relief. New doctrine was needed. It was immaterial to counsel and to client alike
whether a court would strike the statute down in reliance upon Lochner
v. New York," the first amendment, the ninth amendment, any clause
of the fourteenth amendment, or all clauses of the fourteenth amendment, or none.
"Doctrine" on a given day is a contingent amalgam of need, opportunity and choice. The doctrines available in any legal taxonomy
reflect the accommodations already reached between an enduring text
and previous exigencies. The task, for counsel and court alike, is to so
refine and deploy the available categories of thought that a judicial decision that responds adequately to the demands of the pending case is
possible.
The litigators' task in Griswold, as in any other case, was to press
the facts upon the Supreme Court in a way that would make the justices want to decide in their clients' favor, 10 and to offer theories that
would ease their way toward doing so. They placed their main bet on
privacy, per Warren and Brandeis"' and the literature that had grown
up around the concept, whether keyed to equal protection or due process, and hedged late in the game with a ninth amendment option
presented in case a then-recent article had prepared the Court for that
approach.12 To the litigant, any theory is good if it yields the right
result. Choice and elaboration of doctrine and theory lie with the
Court. The justices, once a decision is reached, face practical problems
of their own in writing an opinion. They may pick from the menu offered by counsel, or range beyond as circumstances and small-group
politics appear to require. After the decision is rendered and released,
9.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

10. This was achieved in Griswold by deciding not to mention in the factual stipulation that
the Planned Parenthood clinic was open to single as well as married women, and in fact had
served some of the former. Inclusion of that fact would have had a profound effect on the Court's
opinion, if not on its decision.
11. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
12. Redlich, Are There "Certain . . . Retained by the People?", 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 787
(1962).

1991]

INTRODUCTION

the bar may assess the impact of the combined labors of the litigants
and the justices on the law as it previously stood, and the academy can
project the rationale of the opinion on the large screen of theory. The
connection between the theories spun out of an opinion and the raw,
specific facts of human misery to which the opinion was at least nominally addressed quickly becomes attenuated. Soon the specifics are entirely lost; only doctrine and theory remain, progressively reified.
Whether the Court continues to recognize its own work in the theoretical discussions that ensue is one question. Whether the specific contours of the next litigant's suffering can be addressed adequately
through doctrine the Court now owns, or through theoretical elaborations of that doctrine that penetrate into the common legal culture is a
different one.
Catherine Roraback spoke eloquently of the human condition that
gave rise to Griswold. Professor Schnably offers an extended, highly
theoretical treatment of the implications of what the Supreme Court
wrote in response to Ms. Roraback's litigation. The intellectual force of
his essay is not dependent on the facts with which Ms. Roraback was
obliged to deal more than a quarter of a century ago. Professor
Fineman, in her turn, makes it plain that the theory of family upon
which Griswold turned is so remote from her conceptual approach to
"family" that notions of privacy emerging from Griswold are irrelevant
to her work. Professor Schneider completes the cycle, bringing us back
into confrontation with the reality of violence against women-once
more, the raw facts of suffering-and challenging us to think anew
about the adequacy of existing law as a vehicle through which that
suffering can be stopped.
Griswold may have nothing to offer Professor Fineman at the level
of theory, nor to Professor Schneider at that of practice. But doctrine
standing alone barely covers the exigencies that called it into being.
Doctrine never speaks directly or adequately to the next set of exigencies that press upon it, and Griswold for all its riches may have nothing
more to give. To understand how much it has already given, consider
an argument made by Connecticut in its brief to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The state, looking to the police power rationale of the
statute, asserted that marriage, the only relation in which sexual relations could legally take place, was regulated by the state not only so
that children may be born and properly reared, but that the
parties to the marriage may themselves be the better citizens;
it being in accordance with the experience of all mankind that
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human beings are happier and are better citizens and better
disposed toward the State, when married and surrounded by
the ties of a family and with childreh.1 3
The state needs citizens who are well disposed toward it. People
with children are thus better disposed. The state may, therefore, prohibit contraception in order to increase the number of hostages held to
assure the good behavior of adults. Today's world in some respects may
be a poorer place than when that brief was written. It is nonetheless
difficult to imagine, even on the most pessimistic prognosis for the
United States Supreme Court, that so primitively statist an argument
could be offered anywhere with a straight face today. If Griswold v.
Connecticut did nothing but discredit the view of the relation between
the citizen and the state expressed in the language quoted, it would still
be worth celebrating-on its twenty-fifth anniversary and regularly
thereafter.

13. Brief of State-Appellee at 14, State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 (1964)
(quoting Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 196-97, 36 A. 34, 37 (1896) (emphasis added).

